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RETHINKING MAC CLAUSES IN THE TIME
OF AKORN, BOSTON SCIENTIFIC, AND
COVID-19
By Samuel Shapiro*

ABSTRACT
The MAC clause is perhaps the most important clause in contract law,
giving acquirers the ability to terminate even the largest agreements in the
face of an often vaguely defined “Material Adverse Change.” For decades,
even though MAC clauses have been present in nearly every merger
agreement, courts have almost universally refused to enforce them. But the
Delaware Chancery Court’s 2018 decision in Akorn may finally change that.
As the world deals with the economic uncertainty caused by COVID-19, courts
may soon get more opportunities to decide whether or not they will follow
Akorn’s lead and begin to allow companies to exit agreements. In this Article,
I argue that they should.
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INTRODUCTION
In any acquisition, lawyers are tasked with creating value, and allocating
risk and uncertainty is one of the many ways they can do so. 1 Perhaps no tool
at their disposal is as effective at allocating uncertainty as the Material Adverse
Change (MAC) clause. 2 The MAC clause, a mainstay in nearly every modern
acquisition, allows buyers the option to terminate a deal during the period between signing and closing in the event of an (often vaguely defined) “material
adverse change.” 3 While the existence of a MAC clause can provide parties
with the peace of mind to sign a deal, the clause’s capacity to single-handedly
fell massive transactions has made it the most important clause in contract law
today. 4
1. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE & IMAN ANABTAWI, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: A
TRANSACTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 13-15 (2017) (explaining ways in which lawyers can add value to
deals).
2. Material Adverse Change (MAC) and Material Adverse Effect (MAE) are often used
interchangeably to describe these clauses. The definition of the two is close but not identical, so for
purposes of simplicity, this Article will use MAC to describe both. For a detailed discussion of the
differences between the two terms, see Kenneth A. Adams, A Legal Usage Analysis of “Material
Adverse Change” Provisions, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 9, 17–20 (2004).
3. NIXON PEABODY LLP, 2017 MAC SURVEY 4–5 (2017), https://www.nixonpeabody.com
/-/media/Files/PDF-Others/mac-survey-2017-nixon-peabody.ashx?la=en. The well-respected survey
found that some variant of a MAC clause is found in roughly 89% of large acquisition agreements.
Id. at 5. This Article will assume that the buyer is always the party trying to claim a MAC has occurred (as does most scholarly literature on the subject), even though one study estimated that the
seller is actually the party asserting that there’s been a MAC up to 21% of the time. See Antonio J.
Macias, Risk Allocation and Flexibility in Acquisitions: The Economic Impact of Material-AdverseChange (MACs) Clauses 56 (Apr. 17, 2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1108792.
4. Andrew Schwartz, A “Standard Clause Analysis” of the Frustration Doctrine and the
Material Adverse Change Clause, 57 UCLA L. REV. 789, 824 (2009) (“Beyond the huge sums at
stake, invocation of a MAC clause in a sensitive corporate acquisition could trigger ‘financial chaos’ and a ‘broader systemic crisis’ with ‘significant risks . . . for the financial system as a whole.’ In
short, the MAC clause is the most important standard clause in contract law today, and a clear and
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Although MAC clauses have been around for a long time, the Delaware
Chancery Court’s 2001 decision in IBP 5 laid the groundwork for more than a
decade of consistently seller-friendly rulings. 6 In case after case following IBP,
courts refused to find that MACs had occurred, even in the face of circumstances and changes that might clearly seem “material” to anyone besides the judges
that ultimately made the decisions. 7 During the financial crisis of the late
2000s, as buyers increasingly faced the prospect of being forced to acquire
companies whose financial situations had rapidly deteriorated after deals had
been signed, the IBP precedent often left them with very high legal barriers to
clear in order to call off their agreements. 8 Buyers still were able to leverage
the threat of MACs to force renegotiated deals with more favorable terms, but
that threat was tempered by the lack of buyer-friendly court precedent. 9
In 2018, however, the Delaware Chancery Court appeared to finally open
the door for a change in tone. Akorn v. Fresenius, 10 which was subsequently affirmed by the state’s highest court, marked the first time a Delaware court had
ruled that a MAC had occurred. 11 In the wake of Akorn, there is uncertainty
over how broadly the scope of the court’s ruling should be treated, with some
contending that the egregious facts of the case make this decision the exception,
not the rule. 12 I argue the opposite, that the court’s reasoning opens the door for
future rulings to finally treat MAC clauses the way that contract law demands. 13
sensible interpretation of the MAC clause is therefore in the public interest.”); see also Michael J.
de la Merced, Cerberus Kills $1.1 Billion Deal With Innkeepers, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 22,
2011), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/22/cerberus-ends-1-1-billion-innkeepers-deal/ (MAC
invoked as reason to cancel $1 billion deal); see also Dana Cimilluca & Dennis K. Berman, KKR,
Goldman Cancel $8 Billion Harman Deal, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2007, at A3 (showing a scenario
where MAC invoked as reason to cancel $8 billion deal).
5. See IBP, Inc., v. Tyson Foods Inc., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001).
6. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 827-28.
7. See id. (“[T]he materiality standard has been interpreted by courts to be so demanding
that—absent a cataclysm of biblical proportions—it cannot be met.”).
8. See generally STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF, GODS AT WAR: SHOTGUN TAKEOVERS,
GOVERNMENT BY DEAL, AND THE PRIVATE EQUITY IMPLOSION 70 (2009).
9. See id.; see also Macias, supra note 3, at 1 (estimating that renegotiations occur before
closing in 11% of acquisitions).
10. C.A. No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 WL 4719347 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018), aff’d, 198 A.3d
724 (Del. 2018).
11. The Ann. Surv. Working Grp. of the M&A Juris. Subcomm., Mergers and Acquisitions
Comm., ABA, Bus. L. Section, Annual Survey of Judicial Developments Pertaining to Mergers and
Acquisitions, 74 BUS. LAW. 437, 439 (2019).
12. See Albert H. Manwaring IV, Extraordinary Circumstances MAE Allow a Buyer to
Break a Bad Deal, MORRIS JAMES DEL. (Nov. 25, 2018), https://www.morrisjames.com/pp/article1018.pdf (arguing that the court in Akorn is merely applying existing precedent to an egregious set
of facts and therefore the decision creates no new precedent); but see Richard W. Slack & Joshua
M. Glasser, The Material Adverse Effect Landscape After Akorn v. Fresenius, 15 PRATT’S JOURNAL
OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 29, 40–44 (2019) (making the case for ways in which Akorn could potentially impact future MAC enforcement).
13. See also Borders v. KLRB, 727 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex. App. 1987) (“a court cannot . . .
make a new contract for the parties, one they did not make”).
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Although IBP and its successors defined materiality, duration, purpose, and
foreseeability in ways clearly contrary to the intent of negotiators, Akorn finally
rights decades of wrongs, giving buyers the contractual remedy that they deserve.
Part I of this Article explains how and where MAC clauses are incorporated
into deals and the various exceptions and carve-outs buyers and sellers haggle
over. Part II traces the evolution of MAC clauses, discussing how IBP set the
stage for other seminal cases such as Frontier Oil and Hexion and how the impact of those rulings permeated through mergers and acquisitions law in the late
2000s and beyond. Part III details the Akorn decision and examines how the
ruling may finally have opened the door for a more efficient, reasonable, and
ultimately more buyer-friendly interpretation of MAC clauses. This also requires considering the impact of the Delaware Chancery Court’s recent Boston
Scientific 14 ruling, which, while adverse to Akorn, is ultimately distinguishable.
The Article concludes by examining how COVID-19 and its aftermath will
force courts to decide how Akorn will be applied, as the virus will likely cause a
rise in terminated deals and present courts with more MAC claims than they’ve
seen since the last financial crisis.
I. WHAT IS A MAC?
A. Defining MACs
MAC clauses typically serve two purposes within acquisition agreements. 15
First, they are used to establish a qualifying threshold for many of the representations and warranties made by both parties, reading, for example, that “a target
has complied with all environmental laws except as would not have a Material
Adverse Effect.” 16 Setting this threshold prevents immaterial discretions and
discrepancies from being used as a legal basis to threaten a large deal. 17
Second, and most notable for the purposes of this article, MAC clauses can
be used as a more general catch-all for circumstances that would allow a party,
usually the buyer, to walk away from a deal entirely. 18 Given the amount of
time, energy, and money that goes into most acquisitions, not to mention the
attention these acquisitions draw from investors and the media, the potential in14. Channel Medsystems Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corp., No. 2018-0673-AGB, 2019 WL
6896462 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2019).
15. NIXON PEABODY LLP, supra note 3, at 4.
16. Id. Another example of this is the “Weinstein Clause,” which has been added in response
to the recent #MeToo movement for the purpose of forcing merging companies to disclose any allegations of sexual harassment that may eventually result in a material adverse effect. See Elizabeth
C. Tippet, #MeToo Movement Finds an Unlikely Champion in Wall Street With the New “Weinstein
Clause,” CONVERSATION (Aug. 3, 2018, 6:41 AM). http://theconversation.com/metoo-movementfinds-an-unlikely-champion-in-wall-street-with-the-new-weinstein-clause-100938.
17. NIXON PEABODY LLP, supra note 3, at 4.
18. Id.
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vocation of a MAC clause is no small issue, which is why they are included in
roughly 90% of deals. 19 Even if a MAC is never invoked, its impact is omnipresent as the primary vehicle for fixing the cost-shifting problem present between buyers and sellers. 20 Between signing and closing, sellers still necessarily retain at least some control of their business, even though they no longer have
a stake in the future performance of the business. 21 By forcing sellers to bear
the cost of any downturn in performance, buyers are given an incentive to make
sure the business continues to run smoothly until they’ve turned over the keys to
the acquirer. 22
B. Common Exceptions and Carve-Outs
While parties may agree to include a MAC in almost every deal, they rarely
agree on exactly what that MAC should look like. 23 The process of negotiating
such deals typically involves a tug of war between the opposing parties over
what exceptions should be included. 24 Buyers usually look for the broadest
possible clause, giving them the legal wiggle room to argue that a MAC has occurred in almost any circumstance. 25 Sellers, on the other hand, fight to include
as many exceptions as possible. 26 Examining years of these deals shows that
some exceptions are present in nearly all MAC clauses, while others are rarely
seen except in the most seller-friendly of MACs. 27 One of the most common
exceptions is for changes in the economy as a whole, which appears in a whopping 85% of deals (and this number rises to 96% in deals valued over one bil-

19. Id. at 6.
20. See id. at 4.
21. See id. In addition to concerns over the operation of the business after signing, there are
also concerns of information asymmetry before signing. Without a MAC clause and other representations and warranties, there would be a “lemon problem” as buyers assume sellers are hiding problems from them that would lead to a lower acquisition price. In this way, MACs create value by
reducing the need for buyers to discount valuations to account for such information asymmetry. See
Yair. Y. Galil, MAC Clauses in a Materially Adversely Changed Economy, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 846, 849 (2002).
22. Ronald Gilson and Alan Schwartz wrote an influential 2005 article on this problem, hypothesizing that while risk allocation is a purpose of MAC clauses, sellers should only be held responsible for material changes that are within their control. The policy purpose of these clauses,
they say, is to incentivize sellers to make investments that complement a deal’s synergies by giving
the buyer a credible means of abandoning the deal. While external changes obviously can negatively
impact a buyer’s investment, it doesn’t serve any policy purpose to use MAC clauses to put the burden of those changes onto sellers. There’s a significant amount of moral hazard that’s created once
the seller turns from the principal of the business to the agent of the buyer, and MAC enforcement
can be the vehicle for mitigating this moral hazard. See Ronald Gilson and Alan Schwartz, Understanding MACs: Moral Hazard in Acquisitions, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 330 (2005).
23. NIXON PEABODY LLP, supra note 3, at 4.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 5-6.
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lion dollars). 28 Following the 9/11 attacks on the United States, there was rampant speculation regarding whether such major calamities could or should impact acquisitions, and MACs began to include exceptions for acts of terrorism. 29
Today, clauses exempting such acts, or equivalent changes in political conditions or war, are present in around 80% of agreements. 30 Changes in laws or
regulations are exempted in a similar number of agreements. 31 There is speculation that Brexit could trigger a similar discussion with deals involving England or Europe, although that effect has yet to become clear. 32 In the next decade it will be worth keeping an eye on whether companies start to include
exceptions for climate change (and the resulting regulation) as a trigger for
MACs, as even large companies have started to use the language “material adverse effect” to describe the effects of fossil fuel divestment on their businesses. 33 Other topics that pop up in a majority of agreements include the effects of
the announcement of the deal (76%), changes in GAAP (80%), and perhaps
most importantly, the failure by the seller to reach earnings or revenue projections (67%). 34
C. MACs in Practice: A Tool for Renegotiation
Even though sellers may be willing to fight tooth and nail for each additional exclusion, it is possible that all of the time spent hashing out these details is
for naught. Inconsistent judicial interpretations of MACs have left both buyers
and sellers uncertain what the result of litigating their claims would be. 35 As a
result, many argue that the primary effect of MACs is seen outside of the court-

28. Id. at 9.
29. See Keri K. Hall, How Big is the MAC?: Material Adverse Change Clauses in Today’s
Acquisition Environment, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1088–89 (2003) (giving examples of how
agreements began to address terrorism in the wake of 9/11).
30. NIXON PEABODY LLP, supra note 3, at 10.
31. Id. at 11.
32. See SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, BREXIT: ISSUES AND Q&A FOR BUSINESSES 10, 16
(2016),
http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2016/06/BrexitWhat
DoestheVoteMeanforBusinessFIAFR062816.pdf (advising practitioners on how to approach uncertainty in the wake of Brexit and how MACs could help); see also Travers Smith LLP, Brexit, Force
Majeure and Material Adverse Change Clauses, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 13 2019),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=9e5ee57d-b402-4b78-93ad-09da0cda2094 (analyzing how a recent case could shed light on how courts will interpret MACs triggered by Brexit and
determining that Brexit will likely be treated the same way that other macroeconomic changes have
been).
33. Bill McKibben, Money is the Oxygen on Which the Fire of Global Warming Burns, NEW
YORKER (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/money-is-the-oxygenon-which-the-fire-of-global-warming-burns.
34. NIXON PEABODY LLP, supra note 3, at 13.
35. See generally Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in the Last Period of Play, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 1899 (2003) (arguing that MACs and other deal protection devices are burdened
by the uncertainty of not knowing what the result of litigation would be).
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room, as parties are incentivized to settle their claims by simply renegotiating
the terms of the initial deal. 36
There are plenty of instances where renegotiations forced by alleged MACs
have gone public. 37 Perhaps the most notable example was in 2007, when private equity giant KKR asserted that a MAC had occurred in its $8 billion buyout of stereo maker Harman and announced its intention to cancel the transaction. 38 Although neither party could have been sure of how a court would have
ruled if Harman disputed the MAC and brought the case to trial, the potential
cost and uncertainty of litigation was enough to incentivize Harman to agree on
a much smaller investment rather than a buyout. 39
Although this was an extreme example of renegotiation, research has indicated that these renegotiations are consistently fruitful for buyers, leading to a
15% reduction in sale price on average. 40 This is clear evidence that MACs do
affect deals, although it doesn’t show how much of an impact the precise terms
and exclusions of the clause have. 41 Like any type of out-of-court agreement,
parties are forced to make their own estimates of what going to trial would
mean, and estimating the trial outcome means estimating the chance of a judge
or jury determining that a MAC has occurred. Given the friendly precedent,
sellers have a lot of leeway to argue that they will prevail. 42 If that precedent
36. See, e.g., Steven Davidoff Solomon, In Abbott’s Bid to Halt Purchase of Alere, the MAC
Makes a Comeback, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016
/12/07/business/dealbook/abbott-laboratories-alere-mac-clause.html (“Thus a MAC invocation is
really a renegotiation tool for a lower price.”).
37. See, e.g., Michelle Cortez, Abbott and Alere Agree to Play Nice With $5.3 Billion Deal,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-14/abbott-saidto-agree-to-buy-alere-at-lower-price-of-51-shr-ft (describing how two companies settled for lower
purchase price after MAC was asserted); see also Mike Spector & Kris Hudson, Cerberus Calls Off
Innkeepers Deal, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 23, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB
10001424053111903327904576524352061142240 (describing deal that was called off after buyer
asserted that a MAC had occurred); Nick Brown & Jonathan Stempel, Innkeepers Ends Dispute, To
Sell Hotels for $1 Billion, REUTERS (Oct. 19, 2011), https://www.reuters.com/article/usinnkeepers/innkeepers-ends-dispute-to-sell-hotels-for-1-billion-idUSTRE79I61E20111019 (describing the parties reconciling after renegotiating deal at $100 million lower purchase price).
38. Dana Cimilluca & Dennis K. Berman, KKR, Goldman Cancel $8 Billion Harman Deal,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2007, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB119040506637935532.
39. See KKR, Goldman Cancel Harman Buy for Lesser Investment, CNBC (Oct. 22, 2007,
4:40 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/id/21415054.
40. Macias, supra note 4, at 27.
41. One study argued that the terms don’t affect deals at all, since markets do not react materially to the announcement of the precise terms of merger deals. See Jeffrey Manns & Robert Anderson IV, The Merger Agreement Myth, 98 CORNELL. L. REV. 1143, 1175 (2013). However, while
this might mean that MACs have a muted impact, if this were strictly true, it would be hard to explain why there have been so many examples of successful renegotiations.
42. In his book on the history of deal-making leading up to the financial crisis, Steven Davidoff discusses MACs in detail and argues that the qualitative, uncertain nature of MAC clauses
may benefit both buyer and sellers. While the benefits of the existence of the clause for buyers is
obvious (see, the average 15% decrease in price), Davidoff argues that sellers appreciate that ability
to argue that there’s a chance that court’s will find in their favor regardless of the gravity of the adverse event. A more quantitative threshold could essentially eliminate renegotiation and allow deals
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were to flip, however, it is quite possible that we would see that 15% figure
grow much larger. 43 As such, even though many disputes are settled out of
court, how courts (particularly in Delaware) rule when disputes do get adjudicated is still extremely important to dealmakers everywhere.
II. HOW COURTS HAVE INTERPRETED MAC CLAUSES
A. Pre-IBP: Uncertainty
Before IBP, the case law surrounding the enforcement of MACs was inconclusive at best, and the lack of court decisions focused solely on interpreting
MAC clauses left courts with no single case to point to as the gold standard. 44
The most cited cases often addressed specific aspects of MACs, focusing on
deal-specific facts that couldn’t be applied broadly, and no case established an
effective framework for determining perhaps the most important factor, materiality. 45
An early case, Raskin v. Birmingham Steel, was perhaps the closest the Delaware courts came to declaring a MAC had occurred prior to the 2018 Akorn
decision. 46 In late 1989, Birmingham Steel announced its intent to merge with
the Harbert Corporation. 47 After the merger agreement was reached, Birmingham announced that its earnings had declined by more than 50% from the same
period the year before, sending Harbert shareholders into a frenzy and forcing
their board to invoke the MAC clause. 48 While the parties settled out of court (a
textbook example of renegotiation forced by the MAC clause) the Delaware
Chancery Court considered the merits of the case before approving the settle-

to completely implode, which would likely benefit neither side. See DAVIDOFF, supra note 8, at 62
(arguing that the qualitative, uncertain nature of MAC clauses may benefit both buyer and sellers).
43. In a novel and compelling article, Y. Carson Zhou makes the case that even before
Akorn, the Delaware standard for establishing a MAC was actually buyer-friendly because of how
courts had adjudicated pre-trial motions in MAC cases. He says that the “factual nature of this inquiry means that courts are reluctant to reject a buyer’s [MAC] assertion at the summary judgment
or motion to dismiss stage. This favors the buyer by drawing out litigation, raising costs, and increasing deal uncertainty.” Even if this is true, however, this doesn’t mean that the overall standard
set by Delaware courts is not seller-friendly, it just helps to provide an explanation of how buyers
have managed to command 15% price drops during renegotiations. Y. Carson Zhou, Material Adverse Effects as Buyer-Friendly Standard, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 171, 175 (2016).
44. See Sherri L. Toub, “Buyer’s Regret” No Longer: Drafting Effective MAC clauses in a
Post-IBP Environment, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 849, 871 (2003).
45. See id. at 859.
46. See Raskin v. Birmingham Steel Corp., No. 11365, 1990 WL 193326 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4,
1990).
47. Id. at *1.
48. Id. at *2.
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ment agreement and suggested that it would have been possible that even such a
short-term drop would have been deemed material before IBP. 49
In another example of a more buyer-friendly worldview before IBP, the
Western District of Pennsylvania ruled that a MAC had occurred in the acquisition of an energy company. 50 In this unique case, the merger occurred in the
shadow of a pending state law meant to deregulate the industry. 51 While both
parties were aware of the coming law, neither was aware of what the impact
would be, and so they added a MAC clause that came into effect only if one
party was affected disproportionately to the other. 52 When the dust settled, one
company faced a $1 billion impact, nearly eight times that of the other company, which the court ruled to be material. 53
The uniqueness of the cases, however, made them the exceptions, not the
rule. Even before IBP cemented the Delaware position on the issue, courts tended to lean toward seller-friendly rulings, or no rulings at all. 54 In Pine State
Creamery, a court declined to rule that a MAC had occurred despite an accounting error that hid a $400,000 loss over a two month period. 55 The court ruled
that in the absence of a materiality threshold, and given the seasonal nature of
the business in question (dairy), they could not find a MAC without having a
clearer picture of what the parties intended when they made the agreement. 56
Two other rulings within the same year declined to find a MAC because the
clause in question did not include any mention of future business prospects and
the courts declined to read in such an interpretation themselves. 57 It would only
be another year, however, until Delaware would have the opportunity to finally
sink its teeth into MACs.

49. Id. at *5. (“[T]he record is strong that the financial performance of Birmingham following the execution of the merger agreement constituted a material adverse change in financial conditions of Birmingham” although the court allowed that it is possible this might not have been a MAC
if there was “a full record . . . placed in a larger context”); see Bryan Monson, The Modern MAC:
Allocating Deal Risk in the Post-IBP v. Tyson World, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 769, *786 (2015) (asserting that Raskin indicates that even a small short-term decline could satisfy the materiality standard
prior to IBP).
50. Allegheny Energy v. DQE, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 482, 518 (W.D. Pa. 1999), aff’d, 216
F.3d 1075 (3d Cir. 2000).
51. Id. at 485–88.
52. See id. at 490–91.
53. Id. at 518.
54. See Jonathon M. Grech,”Opting Out”—Defining the Material Adverse Change Clause in
a Volatile Economy, 52 EMORY L.J. 1483, 1514 (2003) (“In the end, then, the court’s “sellerfriendly perspective” is consistent with prior interpretations of similarly broad clauses.”).
55. See generally Pine State Creamery Co. v. Land-O-Sun Dairies, Inc., No, 98-2441, 1999
WL 1082539 (4th Cir. 1999).
56. Id. at 5–6.
57. Goodman Mfg. Co. L.P., v. Raytheon Co., No. 98 Civ. 2774 (LAP), 1999 WL 681382
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 1999); Pacheco v. Cambridge Tech. Partners (Mass.), Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 69
(D. Mass. 2000).
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B. IBP
In 2001, the Delaware Chancery Court made the ruling that would define
MAC clauses for the next two decades. 58 In 2000, Smithfield, the nation’s largest pork producer, and Tyson, the largest poultry producer, began inquiring
about the potential of buying IBP, then the largest beef producer and second
largest pork producer. 59 Tyson saw an opportunity to dominate the market,
viewing an acquisition of IBP as an opportunity “to create the world’s preeminent meat products company.” 60 As such, the stakes of the potential transaction
were high, fundamentally realigning meat distribution in not just America, but
potentially the world. 61
The competition between Smithfield and Tyson escalated into a bidding
war. 62 During this auction process, Tyson was made aware of many flaws within IBP, ranging from inaccurate projections and management shortcomings to
accounting fraud within one of IBP’s units. 63 Despite these red flags, Tyson’s
eagerness to put a stranglehold on the market led them not to pull back, but rather to increase their bid by over $4 per share and ultimately sign a merger
agreement that did little to address these problems. 64
The two quarters that followed the signing of the agreement were dismal for
both Tyson and IBP, in the midst of a severe winter that negatively affected
both companies. 65 Around this time, Tyson began to express doubts about following through with the transaction. 66 IBP had given them plenty to worry
about, with increased SEC interest in the accounting improprieties compounding IBP’s worrisome performance. 67 Tyson began to balk at moving forward,
and eventually notified IBP of their intent to terminate the agreement, asserting

58. In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001).
59. Id. at 21.
60. Id. at 22.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. (According to Vice Chancellor Strine’s opinion, the merger agreement “permitted
IBP to recognize unlimited additional liabilities on account of the accounting improprieties . . .
without demanding any representation that IBP meet its projections for future earnings, or any escrow tied to these projections.”).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.

Spring 2021]

Rethinking Mac Clauses

251

that a MAC had occurred. 68 Litigation ensued, and the Delaware Chancery
Court heard the case in short order. 69
Vice Chancellor Leo Strine’s 64-page opinion offered a fact-intensive dive
into the mistakes both parties had made in consummating the transaction.
Strine ultimately ruled that a MAC had not occurred and ordered specific performance, chalking up Tyson’s change of heart to buyer’s remorse instead of a
real material adverse change. 70 Strine’s opinion reflected his view that there
was concerted corporate effort on the part of Tyson to find any excuse to terminate a transaction that no longer looked financially feasible, not because of any
new material developments, but rather as a result of deficiencies they were already aware of and had perhaps overlooked in their zeal for becoming the undisputed champions of American meat distribution. 71
Strine denied Tyson’s first argument, that IBP’s poor first quarter performance was itself a MAC, by dismissing those numbers as mere short term concerns. 72 Acquirers of companies, he said, can only consider MACs when there
are changes to the “business or results of operations that [are] consequential to
the company’s earning power over a commercially reasonable period, which
one would think would be measured in years rather than months.” 73 He referred
to one quarter of earnings as a mere “blip,” 74 and offered that MAC clauses are
“best read as a backstop protecting the acquirer from the occurrence of unknown events that substantially threaten the overall earnings potential of a target in a durationally-significant manner.” 75 He then elaborated his position that
the specifics of IBP’s poor quarter did not rise to the level of materiality to be
qualified as durationally significant. 76 He also dismissed Tyson’s concerns
about accounting improprieties as irrelevant, since they were insignificant in the

68. Id. at 23 (The merger agreement defined a MAC as follows: Section 5.10 . . . Except as
set forth in Schedule 5.10 hereto . . . since the Balance Sheet Date . . . there has not been: (a) any
event, occurrence or development of a state of circumstances or facts which has had or reasonably
could be expected to have a Material Adverse Effect; (b) other than [limited list of exceptions].).
IBP, Inc. and Tyson Foods, Inc., Agreement and Plan of Merger, FindLaw by Thomson Reuters
[hereinafter Agreement], https://corporate.findlaw.com/contracts/planning/agreement-and-plan-ofmerger-ibp-inc-and-tyson-foods-inc.html, (last visited Mar. 25, 2020).
69. Id. at 23.
70. Id. at 65 (“[I]t is useful to be mindful that Tyson’s publicly expressed reasons for terminating the Merger did not include an assertion that IBP had suffered a [MAC].”); Id. at 84 (ordering
specific performance).
71. Id. at 50–51 (detailing the process by which Tyson finally decided to terminate the
agreement while making clear that a [MAC] was not considered until after that decision had been
made).
72. Id. at 67.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 68.
76. See id. at 69–72.
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grand scheme of the deal and Tyson’s upper management made statements that
showed they believed as such. 77
Ultimately, Strine ordered specific performance, forcing the parties, bad
blood notwithstanding, to complete the merger. 78 This decision had obvious
consequences for the companies involved, but it also would define MAC jurisprudence for years to come.
C. Post-IBP
1. An Immediate Shift Toward Seller-Friendliness
Strine’s decision left courts with some answers. It was clear that (1) prudent acquirers should avoid public statements like those made by Tyson’s CEO
that made it look like the MAC was just being used as a backstop to escape
buyer’s remorse, and (2) that sellers should seek to make sure their agreements
were controlled by Delaware Law. 79 But IBP still did not give total clarity to
some big questions, particularly in regards to the acceptable materiality threshold for triggering the new “durational significance” standard. 80 As a result, the
next decade of court cases still lacked consistency, as courts were often left to
pick and choose specific clauses of Strine’s opinion to justify their result. 81 But
one common thread was clear: Seller-friendly rulings made it nearly impossible
for buyers to successfully litigate MAC disputes to completion. 82 Of course,
this did not mean that buyers were left out in the cold, since using the threat of a

77. Id. at 23 (“Don Tyson abandoned the Merger agreement because of poor results in 2001,
and not because of [the accounting issue].)”; id. at 70 (Strine notes that the part of the company with
the accounting issue “is but a tiny fraction of IBP’s overall business and that total shut-down of [that
part] would likely have little effect on the future results of a combined Tyson/IBP.”).
78. Id. at 84.
79. Bradley D. Peters, Material Adverse Change Clauses Following the Tyson Decision, 3
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 19, 22 (2001). Although the Chancery Court decided IBP under
New York state law, it adopted IBP’s holding under Delaware law in its 2005 decision in Frontier
Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., No. CivA. 20502, 2005 WL 1039027 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005).
80. DAVIDOFF, supra note 8, at 64.
81. See Robert T. Miller, Cancelling the Deal: Two Models of Material Adverse Change
Clauses in Business Combination Agreements, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 99, 130–43 (2009). Professor
Robert T. Miller asserts that courts did in fact rely on a consistent framework to adjudicate MAC
claims in the wake of IBP, a system he called the “Earnings Potential Model.” Id. at 100. The model
suggested that courts compared metrics like EBITDA over relevant fiscal periods to estimate the
present and future earnings of affected companies and determine whether earnings had declined
relative to historical standards. Id. These courts, however, had failed to identify precisely which
fiscal periods should be compared and what threshold of materiality should be used over those periods. Id. In his article, Miller suggests a new model, which he calls the Continuing Profitability
Model, using a more complicated system of discounted cash flow to determine whether or not an
acquirer’s equity is now less than it was at purchase. Id. at 101. If so, there has been a MAC. Id. at
101–02.
82. DAVIDOFF, supra note 8, at 64.
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MAC to try to renegotiate more favorable terms would, at worst, lead to them
simply going forward with a deal they had already agreed to. 83
But IBP was not the only development that favored sellers. The mid-2000s
saw an increase in the number of exclusions that sellers were including in MAC
clauses, further limiting the grounds the buyers could use to assert a MAC. 84
Courts seemed to endorse this trend, rejecting claims that might previously have
fallen within the ambit of broad MACs by essentially implying exclusions into
MACs for specific claims. In Great Lakes Chemical v. Pharmacia, the Chancery Court said that it was incumbent on dealmakers to include language in
MACs specifying whether the clause covers both internal and external changes
if they want to guarantee that the court will consider both. 85 In S.C. Johnson &
Son v. Dowbrands, a federal court in Delaware rejected a MAC claim on the
basis that pending litigation could not be used as the grounds for a MAC in the
absence of a specific provision including such a claim within the reach of the
MAC. 86 Overall, courts were making it clear that there was a “substantial burden on a remorseful buyer attempting to prove a MAC.” 87
2. Hexion v. Huntsman
Perhaps the most important of the post-IBP cases was a 2007 Delaware
Chancery Court ruling in Hexion v. Huntsman. 88 In early 2007, Hexion, a large
manufacturer of chemical products, sought to purchase Huntsman, another
chemical manufacturer. 89 After the merger agreement was signed, closing was
delayed until the following year as the parties awaited regulatory clearance. 90
In that time, Hexion began to get cold feet, worried that the prospective combined entity might be insolvent. 91 Hexion initiated litigation, alleging that
Huntsman’s poor earnings reports since the signing of the initial agreement constituted a MAC. 92
83. Id. at 65.
84. Id. at 66.
85. See Great Lakes Chem. Corp. v. Pharmacia Corp., 788 A.2d 544, 556 (Del. Ch. 2001)
(stating that the interpretation that the agreement is only meant to encompass external changes “may
ultimately prevail on a developed factual record” but that “had the parties intended to exclude from
the provision’s scope all external events that materially affect the Company’s business, they could
have included such an express limitation in their Agreement”). For more information on the differences between internal and external changes, see Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 22.
86. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. DowBrands, Inc.,167 F. Supp. 2d 657, 670–71 (D. Del.
2001) (“The sole decision by a third party to bring a lawsuit does not bring about any change in the
company’s assets . . . the Court concludes that the [litigation] does not constitute a basis for SCJ’s
claim that DowBrands breached . . . the Agreement.”).
87. DAVIDOFF, supra note 8, at 64.
88. Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715 (Del. Ch. 2008).
89. Id. at 720–21.
90. Id. at 721.
91. Id.
92. Id. 721–22.
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The court sided with Huntsman, citing IBP’s language in its finding that a
MAC had not occurred. 93 While Huntsman’s performance had declined, it had
only suffered a 3% hit to its EBITDA from 2006 to 2007, and management only
expected a 7% decline from 2007 to 2008. 94 Despite Hexion’s projections that
the following year would bring far greater declines that would greatly hamper
Huntsman’s future profitability, the court rejected these forecasts as “overly
pessimistic. 95 The court cited several macroeconomic challenges faced by
Huntsman (seemingly excluding external changes from the MAC definition)
before stating “[u]ltimately, the burden is on Hexion to demonstrate the existence of [a MAC] in order to negate its obligation to close, and that is a burden it
cannot meet here.” 96
While Vice Chancellor Lamb’s ruling directly applied IBP’s reasoning to
new facts (with the same result), it is important to note that he did so without
even diving into the exclusions that attorneys had included in the original
deal. 97 Instead, he rejected Hexion’s argument by stating that a MAC had not
occurred under the broad definition one would ascribe to the most general MAC
clause. 98 This signaled the court’s intention to set a high bar for MAC claims, a
bar that became particularly important as America entered the financial crisis. 99
3. The Financial Crisis
While Hexion’s claim may have been the most notable MAC to be litigated,
it was far from the only dispute in the late 2000s. Buyers began to threaten (and
follow through on) MAC claims, particularly in lending industries that were
most affected by the financial crisis. 100 In 2007, Accredited Home Lenders, a
leading subprime mortgage lender, began to feel the effects of the slowing housing market as more and more borrowers began to default on loans that they perhaps never should have received. 101 Bear Stearns, Accredited’s (now defunct)
investment banker, sought a buyer to provide Accredited with much-needed

93. Id. at 738 (“The important consideration therefore is whether there has been an adverse
change in the target’s business that is consequential to the company’s long-term earnings power
over a commercially reasonable period, which one would expect to be measured in years rather than
months.”).
94. Id. at 742.
95. Id. at 743 (“While the court recognizes that management’s expectations for a company’s
business often skew towards the overly optimistic, especially in the presence of litigation, the court
ultimately concludes that Hexion’s projections reflect an overly pessimistic view of Huntsman’s
future earnings.”).
96. Id. at 743 (citing crude oil and natural gas prices and an unfavorable exchange rate as
macroeconomic challenges).
97. DAVIDOFF, supra note 8, at 73.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 66–73 (detailing the “MAC Wars” of 2007).
101. Id. at 49-50.
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capital to avoid bankruptcy, and an auction ensued. 102 The eventual winner was
Lone Star Funds, which commenced a tender offer on June 1, 2007. 103
Just two months later, it became clear that the mortgage market had continued to deteriorate at a rate that neither party had contemplated. 104 After Accredited’s independent auditors adjusted their projected third quarter losses from
$64 million to $230 million, Lone Star indicated that a MAC had occurred, and
thus they could not go through with the deal. 105 Accredited filed suit in Delaware. 106 Only a month later, the parties announced they had renegotiated their
original deal for $3.35 per share less than the original offer, a 22% decrease. 107
A similar result was achieved in the buyout of Sallie Mae by a consortium
led by J.C. Flowers, Bank of America, and JPMorgan Chase. 108 Even though
the financial crisis made it more likely than ever that businesses could completely combust, rather than just showing an earnings hiccup, companies continued to renegotiate deals rather than canceling them or bringing them all the
way to trial. Approximately five to ten MAC claims were made public in the
year after the Accredited lawsuit, and only two made it to the trial level. 109
What we may never know is how this would have been different had the
courts made it easier for those asserting MACs to successfully follow through
with their claims. It’s likely that a similar number of claims would settle out of
court, given the incentives present in the legal system to do so, but it is hard to
imagine that sellers would continue to get such favorable settlements. 110 One
factor potentially working in favor of the sellers was intertwined with the reality
of the mergers and acquisitions business around that time. As private equity
firms began to dominate the industry, they sought to use the MAC as reputational cover for getting out of bad deals. 111 This reputational cover was especially important for them due to their status as repeat players in the industry,
102. Id. at 50-51.
103. Id. at 51.
104. Id. at 51-52.
105. Id. at 52-53.
106. Id. at 52.
107. See id. at 69.
108. See id. at 68-70 (however, the deal was later cancelled on other grounds).
109. Id. at 73. Aside from Hexion, only one other major case was ultimately decided by litigation. See Genesco v. Finish Line, No. 07-2137-II(III), 2007 Tenn. Ch. LEXIS 1 (Tenn. Ch. Dec.
27, 2007). That case involved two shoe retailers and was decided in a Tennessee court, under Tennessee law. Because of the unique venue and governing law, it had little precedential impact on
other MAC cases. Id. at 71. For further analysis of the Genesco v. Finish Line litigation, see Bradley C. Sagraves & Bobek Talebian, “Material Adverse Change Clauses in Tennessee: Genesco v.
Finish Line,” 9 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 343 (2008).
110. See Jonathan D. Glater, Study Finds Settling Is Better Than Going to Trial, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 7, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/08/business/08law.html (detailing how settling is
consistently a prudent move over going to trial, regardless of the expected outcome of litigation).
111. See DAVIDOFF, supra note 8, at 106 (discussing methods private equity firms used to get
out of bad deals); see also Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. REV
481 (2009) (discussing private equity firms’ failures and attempts to cover themselves.).
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and a possible reason that courts were reticent to make rulings that MACs had
occurred. 112 Regardless of any pretextual readings of judicial intent, even after
the financial crisis faded away, it would be almost a decade before MAC jurisprudence would be challenged again in a big way.
III. HOW AKORN V. FRESENIUS MAY CHANGE EVERYTHING
A. The Background: Akorn v. Fresenius
1. The Facts
In mid-2017, Fresenius, a German pharmaceutical company, signed an
agreement and plan of merger with Akorn, an American pharmaceutical company. 113 Under the plan, each share of Akorn common stock would be converted into the right to receive $34 per share, which would have made the deal
worth almost $5 billion. 114 Just one year later, however, Fresenius convinced a
Delaware court to let it do what no acquirer had done in the state before: Walk
away from a deal on the grounds that a MAC had occurred. 115
The merger plan conditioned closing on three stipulations. 116 First, Akorn’s
representations must be true and correct, except where failure to be true and
correct would not be reasonably expected to constitute a contractually defined
MAC. 117 Second, Akorn must comply in all material respects with its obligations under the Merger Agreement. 118 Third, Akorn must not suffer a MAC. 119
Combined, these three factors made the qualifiers on the representations and
warranties of the agreement very similar to those found in similar cases (such as
IBP or Hexion) in which the court had ruled that there was no MAC.
Immediately after the agreement was signed, Akorn’s business began to
show a sharp decline. 120 Despite Akorn’s official assurances at signing that its
full year projections remained valid, the second quarter results showed another
sharp drop in performance. 121 Akorn attributed the decline to “increased com-

112. See DAVIDOFF, supra note 8, at 106.
113. Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 WL 4719347, at *1, *4, *5
(Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018), aff’d, 198 A.3d 724 (Del. 2018).
114. Id. at 1; see also Tom Hals, Delaware judge says Fresenius can walk away from $4.8
billion Akorn deal, REUTERS (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-akorn-m-afresenius-ruling/delaware-judge-says-fresenius-can-walk-away-from-4-8-billion-akorn-dealidUSKCN1MB2PY.
115. See Annual Survey, supra note 11, at 439.
116. Akorn, 2018 WL 4719347, at *1.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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petition and the loss of a key contract,” but told Fresenius that “the downturn
was temporary.” 122 But another quarter of bad results was complemented by
two disastrous reports, one from an anonymous whistleblower who alleged that
Akorn’s product development process was falling short of regulatory requirements and a second letter with “equally disturbing allegations about Akorn’s
quality compliance programs.” 123 This prompted Fresenius to initiate its own
investigation, which turned up “serious and pervasive data integrity problems.” 124 Further tension between the two parties arose as Akorn made a poor
showing in front of the FDA, its primary regulator, and Akorn’s business performance continued to decline. 125
On April 22, 2018, Fresenius gave notice that it was terminating the Merger
Agreement on the basis of the three closing conditions being violated. 126 In
other words, Fresenius was asserting a MAC. 127 Akorn immediately filed suit,
setting the stage for the Chancery Court to once again weigh in on MAC clauses. 128

122. Id. at *1–2.
123. Id. at *2.
124. Id.
125. Id. (Vice Chancellor Laster characterized the presentation as “not fully transparent” and
“misleading.”).
126. Id. (“Fresenius asserted that Akorn’s representations regarding regulatory compliance
were so incorrect that the deviation would reasonably be expected to result in a Material Adverse
Effect. Fresenius also cited Akorn’s failure to comply in all material respects with its contractual
obligations under the Merger Agreement, including Akorn’s obligation to use commercially reasonable efforts to operate in the ordinary course of business in all material respects. Fresenius also cited
the section in the Merger Agreement that conditioned Fresenius’s obligation to close on Akorn not
have suffered a Material Adverse Effect.”).
127. Akorn, Inc., Fresenius Kabi AG, Fresenius SE & Co. KGAA, Quercus Acquisition, Inc.,
Agreement and Plan of Merger, SEC ARCHIVES (April 24, 2017), https://www.sec.gov
/Archives/edgar/data/3116/000095015717000499/ex2-1.htm. (The merger agreement defined a
MAC as follows: “Section 3.06. Absence of Certain Changes. Since the Balance Sheet Date through
the date of this Agreement . . . (b) there has not been any Material Adverse Effect or any effect,
change, event or occurrence that would, individually or in the aggregate, reasonably be expected to
have a Material Adverse Effect . . . . Section 8.12. “Material Adverse Effect” means any effect,
change, event or occurrence that, individually or in the aggregate (i) would prevent or materially
delay, interfere with, impair or hinder the consummate of the Transactions or the compliance by the
company with its obligation under this Agreement or (ii) has a material adverse effect on the business, results of operations or financial condition of the Company and its Subsidiaries, taken as a
whole; provided, however, that none of the following, and no effect, change, event or occurrence
arising out of, or resulting from, the following, shall constitute or be taken into account in determining or whether a Material Adverse Effect has occurred, is continuing or would reasonably be expected to occur: [long list of specific and economy-wide exceptions].” It’s worth noting that this list
of exceptions is far more extensive than the list accompanying the IBP and Tyson agreement cited
in note 69.).
128. Akorn, 2018 WL 4719347, at *3.
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2. The Holding
In his lengthy opinion, Vice Chancellor Laster ruled that Fresenius had suffered a MAC. 129 He said that the MAC condition in the agreement was “common,” starting with a general statement and then carving out “certain types of
events that otherwise could give rise” to a MAC. 130 Laster ruled that no carve
out in the contract could be read to place “business risk” onto Fresenius, leaving
the question of whether or not the deviation in the company’s business performance was material. 131 He made it clear that he was abiding by IBP’s definition of materiality, saying that the effect must “substantially threaten the overall
earnings potential of a target in a durationally-significant manner.” 132 He also
followed Hexion, evaluating the magnitude of Akorn’s decline by comparing
the company’s performance against its results in the same quarter the prior
year. 133 While he cited previous precedent and scholarship that suggested materiality thresholds, he noted that he did not consider these binding and that the
ultimate inquiry is fact-specific. 134
In this case, he noted that Akorn’s EBITDA declined by 86% on a yearover-year basis (51% adjusted), a “departure from its historical trend.” 135 He
noted that he believed this decline to be durationally significant since it had already persisted for a year with no sign of reversing and could be attributed to
similarly long-lasting factors such as new market entrants and the loss of a contract that was vital to growth projections. 136 He also considered valuations by
analysts that projected a drop in EBITDA of more than a 60% for the coming
year, more than five times the downturn expected across the industry as a
whole. 137 He also rejected Akorn’s argument that there could not be a MAC as
long as Fresenius was still making a profit on the deal, explicitly invoking the
frustration doctrine (which is discussed at length later in this Article). 138 Laster
concludes his MAC analysis clearly and succinctly: “The record in this case established the existence of a sustained decline in business performance that is
durationally significant and which would be material to a reasonable buyer.
Akorn suffered a [MAC].” 139
129. Id. at *47.
130. Id. at *51.
131. Id. at 52.
132. Id. at 53 (quoting In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 68 (Del. Ch. 2001)).
133. Id.
134. Id. (“These precedents do not foreclose the possibility that a buyer could show that percentage changes of a lesser magnitude constituted [a MAC]. Nor does it exclude the possibility that
a buyer might fail to prove that percentage changes of a greater magnitude constituted [a MAC]”).
135. Id. at *55.
136. Id.
137. Id. at *56.
138. Id. at *57; see infra Part III.B for a discussion of the frustration doctrine.
139. Akorn, 2018 WL 4719347, at *57. It’s also worth noting that one of the other issues addressed in the holding was whether Akorn had breached the Ordinary Course Covenant, which required that Akorn use “commercially reasonable efforts to operate in the ordinary course of business

Spring 2021]

Rethinking Mac Clauses

259

3. The Aftermath
The immediate reaction to Vice Chancellor Laster’s decision and the Supreme Court’s subsequent affirmation was that neither would have any meaningful impact on MAC jurisprudence, since the courts were simply faced with a
unique set of glaring facts. 140 As Laster said:
In prior cases, this court has correctly criticized buyers who agreed to acquisitions,
only to have second thoughts after cyclical trends or industrywide effects negatively impacted their own businesses, and who then filed litigation in an effort to escape their agreements without consulting with the sellers. In these cases, the buyers
claimed that the sellers had suffered contractually defined material adverse effects
under circumstances where the buyers themselves did not seem to believe their assertions.
This case is markedly different. Fresenius responded to a dramatic, unexpected, and company-specific downturn in Akorn’s business that began in the quarter after signing . . . . Any second thoughts that Fresenius had about the Merger
141
Agreement were justified by unexpected events at Akorn.

But even though Laster did not indicate that this ruling was meant to change
the standard set for MACs, what if the ruling was about more than just egregious facts? What if Laster meant to indicate that it was finally time for courts
to move past the IBP framework for adjudicating MAC claims? At the very
least, a compelling argument can be made that Laster’s ruling gives courts the
leeway to start to make more permissive MAC rulings in the future.
B. The Frustration Doctrine and How IBP Ignores Contract Law
In 2009, University of Colorado School of Law Professor Andrew Schwartz
published an article that used a conceptual tool he called a “standard clause
analysis” to interpret MAC clauses and argue that based on his analysis, MACs
were being consistently misapplied by courts and practitioners. 142 While his
analysis is markedly different than the reasoning that had been used by courts
before and after its publication, I argue Akorn both explicitly and implicitly

in all material respects” before closing. Id. at 88. Laster concluded that they had breached the covenant, using many of the same reasons that had impacted the MAC decision. Id. One analysis pointed
out that this finding was notable because Laster appeared to use a much lower threshold for breach
than he used for the MAC analysis. Annual Survey, supra note 11, at 447. Since ordinary course
covenants are common in merger agreements, it also pointed out that this reasoning could be used
by buyers in the future to avoid the need for even asserting a MAC. Id. However, it also observed
that the Delaware Supreme Court expressly refrained from commenting on that portion of the opinion. Id. “[W]e also do not address whether. . . Akorn breached the Ordinary Course Covenant”).
140. Manwaring, supra note 12 (“While this is the first time the Court of Chancery has permitted a buyer to terminate a merger agreement based on a ‘material adverse effect’ on the seller’s
business, the Akorn decision simply represents an application of Delaware’s policy of freedom of
contract to an egregious set of facts.”).
141. See Akorn, 2018 WL 4719347, at 3–4.
142. Schwartz, supra note 4.
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adopts his reasoning for the first time, providing a framework for future courts
to follow.
Schwartz begins by explaining one the core tenets of contract law, default
terms, which apply in the absence of an explicit term addressing a particular
matter. 143 Contracting parties are free to add their own, specific, custom language to account for their personal preferences or more complex situations, but
if they do not add language that addresses any given default terms, courts use
the default terms as gap-fillers. 144 Over time, lawyers developed “standard
clauses” as a happy medium between the simple, untailored default terms and
the time-consuming, complex custom terms that lawyers can add. 145 Schwartz
points to the impracticability doctrine as an example of this framework. 146 The
default term for impracticability dictates that a party to a contract may be excused from performance of the contract if changed circumstances render performance impossible or exceedingly difficult. 147 Contracting parties may add
any terms they choose to cover impracticability, but if the parties don’t add anything, then courts will likely choose to assume the parties intended to incorporate the default term definition of impracticability. 148 However, modern contracts commonly include a Force Majeure clause, which addresses the same
issues that the default term would, but expressly creates its own definition of
impracticability. 149 Force Majeure clauses are thus the “standard clause analog”
for impracticability. 150
Schwartz then describes the doctrine that is relevant for our purposes: frustration. 151 The frustration doctrine closely parallels that of impracticability, but
instead of excusing performance that has become impossible, it excuses performance that has become worthless. 152 To show the frustration doctrine in practice, and distinguish it from impracticability, Schwartz uses the example of an

143. Id. at 794.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 796 (defining “standard clause” and asserting that “Standard clauses are therefore an efficient way to obtain an individualized agreement at modest cost.”).
146. Id. at 801.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. An example from a contracts textbook of a Force Majeure clause: “If any party fails to
perform its obligations because of strikes, lockouts, . . . [list of situations] . . . or other causes beyond the reasonable control of the party obligated to perform, then that party’s performance shall be
excused for so long as the cause for failure to perform persists.” GEORGE W. KUNEY & ROBERT M.
LLOYD, CONTRACTS: TRANSACTIONS AND LITIGATION 815 (4th Ed. 2017).
150. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 801.
151. Id. at 802.
152. Id. (“Where, after a contract is made, a party’s principal purpose is substantially frustrated without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his remaining duties to render performance are discharged,
unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 265 (AM. L. INST. 1981).)).
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early twentieth century British case. 153 In 1902, the owner of an apartment
along a famous London street agreed to rent out the space during the coronation
of King Edward VII. 154 After the coronation was postponed due to the future
king falling ill, the would be tenant refused to pay for the apartment, arguing
that the purpose of the contract (viewing the coronation) had been frustrated, a
viewpoint that a court eventually agreed with. 155 This marked the creation of
frustration doctrine, and it became a default rule of contract law in both England
and America. 156
Keeping with his hypothesis that all default rules must have a standard
clause that allows them to be modified within the context of specific contracts,
Schwartz uses the four elements of frustration to predict what such a standard
clause would look like in a modern contract. 157 In order to “be excused under
the frustration doctrine, part[ies] must first show that [their] ‘principal purpose’
in making the contract was frustrated by an unexpected change in circumstances.” 158 This principle purpose “must be so completely the basis of the contract
that . . . without it the transaction would make little sense.” 159 Since this is the
default frustration term, a standard clause could modify this term by broadening
the number of purposes that could be frustrated. 160 Next, frustration mandates
that the stated purpose must be “totally or nearly” frustrated. 161 A standard
clause could lower this bar, using terms like “material” or “considerably” instead of “totally.” 162 Next, frustration requires an “extraordinary event,” a
standard similar to the previous two elements, but adds a requirement of unforeseeability. 163 While Schwartz points out that unforeseeability is relevant, but
not dispositive, in applying the frustration doctrine, a standard clause could either expressly state the events or types of events that it encompasses, or could
eliminate the requirement entirely. 164 Lastly, frustration requires that the trig-

153. Id. (citing Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K.B. 740 (C.A.)).
154. Id. at 803.
155. Id.
156. Id. (citing the adoption of the doctrine in RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTS. § 288 (1932)
and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 265 (AM. L. INST. 1981) as proof of its acceptance).
157. Id. at 805–12.
158. Id. at 805.
159. Id. at 805–06 quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (AM. L. INST.
1981).
160. Id. at 806.
161. Id. (“Mere unprofitability or even significant losses are insufficient. Rather, a party’s
contractual objectives must have been completely thwarted by the changed conditions such that the
other party’s performance is rendered worthless. Nothing short of a cataclysm or catastrophe will
satisfy this element.”).
162. Id. at 807 (Schwartz points out that whatever term is used, it must set a higher bar than
“slightly,” as such a low threshold could potentially be ruled unenforceable due to a lack of consideration.).
163. Id. at 808–09.
164. Id. at 809–10.
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gering event be exogenous, out of control of the contracting parties. 165 Similar
to the last element, a standard clause could either expressly state the types of
exogenous events that would trigger it, or eliminate the term altogether. 166
Keeping these elements in mind, Schwartz describes several examples of
such standard clauses that are commonly used in their respective industries, including the Morals clause in celebrity endorsements 167 and the Walkaway
clause in vehicle financing agreements. 168 But most importantly, he cites the
MAC clause as an example of a standard clause analog of the frustration doctrine at work in “the most economically significant private contracts on
earth.” 169
Schwartz posits that MAC clauses alter the common law definition of frustration in several ways. Most notably, they employ “the term ‘material,’ thereby establishing a standard lower than the ‘total’ or ‘complete’ loss of value that
the common law would ordinarily demand.” 170 Additionally, MAC carve-outs
serve to closely define what kind of events, foreseeable or otherwise, qualify as
frustrating the relevant purpose. 171 Thus, the MAC clause is perhaps the closest
clause “to being a generic standard clause analog of the frustration doctrine”
that exists today. 172 Schwartz, however, is dismayed by what he sees as a failure by courts “to recognize the MAC clause’s relationship with the frustration
doctrine.” 173 Case law, he says, “has viewed the MAC clause as ‘sui generis’
and has attempted to interpret it in a vacuum, yielding a muddled and unclear
interpretation.” 174 He argues that his analysis, which treats the MAC clause as a
customization of the elements of the default rule, “provides at least three key
insights” regarding how courts should have been interpreting MAC clauses all
along. 175

165. Id. at 811–12.
166. Id. at 812.
167. Id. at 812–15 (giving examples of misbehaving celebrities who rendered endorsement
deals useless by potentially tarnishing the reputation of the company that was paying for them to be
the face of their product, most notably football star Michael Vick, whose involvement and eventual
incarceration for his role in a dogfighting ring left his agreement with Nike of no use to the sports
apparel giant).
168. Id. at 816 (focusing on the Hyundai Assurance program, later copied by many competitors, which “allows the buyer to stop making payments and return the vehicle ‘in case of certain
life-altering circumstances’ that render the car much less valuable than expected, such as unemployment or the loss of a driver’s license. All these events must be exogenous—unemployment
must be involuntary; the loss of one’s license must not have been due to drunk driving.”).
169. Id. at 817.
170. Id. at 822.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 823.
173. Id. at 825.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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At the time Schwartz published his article, the Delaware Chancery Court
had yet to find that a MAC had occurred in even a single case. 176 While law
review articles are influential, they are not binding on courts, and so while future judges may have found Schwartz’s analysis persuasive, many of his claims
may have fallen on deaf ears due to the lack of strong case law precedent for
him to cite to. 177 After Akorn, however, that may change. In the next section, I
describe how each of Schwartz’s insights into viewing MAC clauses as a frustration clause analog provides a clearer set of guidelines for interpreting them,
and how Akorn may finally have provided the long-awaited judicial precedent
to back up his theory.
1. Materiality
The meaning of “material” has been the most contentious point raised over
and over again in the court cases that have dealt with MACs. 178 Just as no Delaware case before Akorn found that a MAC had occurred, no judicial opinion
settled on a firm definition of what materiality threshold is appropriate for these
cases either. Contract law has long defined material breaches as those that “deprive the injured party of the benefit that it justifiably expected,” while securities laws have defined materiality as “important to the reasonable shareholder.” 179 Vice Chancellor Strine’s seminal IBP opinion importantly defined matemateriality as changes that “substantially threaten the overall earnings potential
of the target in a durationally-significant manner,” 180 and the Hexion opinion
suggested that a “heavy burden” was carried by anyone trying to enforce in a
MAC. 181 While the language of these two cases has been routinely adopted in
subsequent decisions, the lack of positive MAC verdicts shows that the “materi-

176. Id. at 791. I’d be remiss to ignore Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Apollo (Mauritas) Holdings Pvt. Lt., No. 8980-VCG, 2014 WL 5654305 (Del. Ch. Oct. 31, 2014), where the Chancery
Court seemed to indicate they were leaning towards ruling that MAC had occurred, but ultimately
decided to leave the issue unaddressed and determined the case on other grounds. Y. Carson Zhou
notes that “The court focused even more heavily on the contractual text than in IBP or Hexion, and
(buyer-friendly) decision turned on deciphering the complex interaction between contractual provisions.” Zhou, supra note 43, at 183. Unfortunately, because the court did not ultimately address the
MAC clause directly, it offers little direct support for Schwartz (or Akorn).
177. THE WRITING CTR AT GEORGETOWN UNIV. L. CTR., WHEN AND HOW TO USE
SECONDARY SOURCES AND PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY TO RESEARCH AND WRITE LEGAL
DOCUMENTS (2014) (explaining that primary sources, such as case law, can be mandatory, binding
authority, while secondary sources, such as law review articles, can only be persuasive authority).
178. See, e.g., Allegheny Energy v. DQE, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 482, 517 (W.D. Pa. 1999),
aff’d, 216 F.3d 1075 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Although there is a common understanding of what the term
‘material’ encompasses, the inherent relatively of this word makes it ambiguous in the absence of
any qualifying language”), Pine State Creamery Co. v. Land-O-Sun Dairies, Inc., No. 98-2441,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 31529, at *16 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[I]t is simply a question of degree regarding
the point that Pine State’s operating losses would become ‘material’”).
179. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 826.
180. In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001).
181. Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 738 (Del. Ch. 2008).
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ality standard has been interpreted by courts to be so demanding that—absent a
cataclysm of biblical proportions—it cannot be met.” 182
This “catastrophe” standard is a perfect example of what Schwartz sees as
the disconnect between how standard clauses should be applied and how courts
have enforced MACs. 183 The frustration doctrine already allows buyers to escape deals if the company they are acquiring experiences a catastrophe. 184
Reading the same threshold into MAC clauses, clauses that lawyers “expend
considerable resources drafting and negotiating,” treats the MAC clause the
same as the default rule. 185 “This interpretation does violence to the foundational principles of freedom of contract and to the interpretive rule that a contract should be read so as not to render any term meaningless.” 186 “Instead,
courts should recognize that the MAC clause, as a standard clause analog of the
frustration doctrine, is intended to contract around—not reiterate—that doctrine.” 187
Schwartz’s prescription for fixing this misconception is twofold. First, he
suggests lowering the MAC threshold (maybe “severe” or “devastating” rather
than “catastrophic”). 188 Second, he recommends doing away with IBP’s “durational significance” requirement, recognizing that (1) “even a short-term loss or
other problem can have long-term consequences for the value of a business as a
going concern” and (2) “the typical MAC clause says nothing about duration.” 189
It’s in this department where Akorn first appears as the knight in shining
armor. Vice Chancellor Laster begins his analysis typically, citing the IBP and
Hexion language. 190 Then, he cites an article and a case that each cited a possible materiality threshold (40% and 50%) before saying that these “precedents
do not foreclose the possibility that a buyer could show that percentage changes
of a lesser magnitude constituted [a MAC]. Nor does it exclude the possibility
that a buyer might fail to prove that percentage changes of a greater magnitude
182. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 827-28. Schwartz points to a Texas case as perhaps the most
glaring example of this “impossibly high” benchmark. Borders v. KRLB, Inc., 727 S.W.2d 357
(Tex. App. 1987) (holding that even though an acquired radio station lost half of its listeners between signing and closing, the court ruled that the station had not “lost its ability to function as a
business entity” and thus the materiality threshold was not breached.).
183. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 828.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. See also Hexion, 965 A.2d (“It is a maxim of contract law that, given ambiguity between potentially conflicting terms, a contract should be read so as not to render any term meaningless.”).
187. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 828.
188. Id. at 829.
189. Id. at 830. I disagree with his first argument here, since “durationally-significant” could
easily be construed to encompass short-term losses with far-reaching impacts, but I agree with his
second argument for why even durational significance is not an appropriate standard.
190. Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 WL 4719347, at *53 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 1, 2018).
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constituted” a MAC. 191 Next, he does what seemingly no major court decision
had done in the previous decade, directly invoking Schwartz’s analysis:
More broadly, the black letter doctrine of frustration of purpose already operates to discharge a contracting party’s obligation when his “principal purpose is
substantially frustrated without his fault by the occurrence of an event the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made.”
This common law doctrine . . . (restates Schwartz). In lieu of the default rule that
performance may be excused only where a contract’s principal purpose is completely or nearly completely frustrated, a contract could “lower this bar to an
achievable level by providing for excuse when the value of counterperformance has
‘materially’ (or ‘considerably’ or ‘significantly’) diminished.” That is what the parties did in this case. It should not be necessary for Fresenius to show a loss on the
192
deal before it can rely on the contractual exit right it negotiated.

Laster uses the frustration clause analysis to discredit Akorn’s contention
that no MAC had occurred unless the circumstances had changed so much that
Fresenius stood to make zero profit from the transaction. 193 Finding a MAC
had occurred in a transaction in which the acquirer still stood to make a profit
marked a clear departure from the “catastrophe” requirement of materiality.
Some may argue that given the high drop in past and projected EBITDA, these
were a severe set of facts that the court was faced with. 194 But nevertheless, I
find it impossible to argue that any deal in which the acquirer stands to profit
constitutes the “total” or “complete” loss of value that Schwartz found that previous courts had required. 195 While Laster doesn’t set a defined lower materiality threshold, he at least acknowledges that the appropriate definition of materiality departs from the common law and recognizes that the existence of MAC
clauses demands a lower threshold. 196
191. Id. The case Laster cites is Raskin v. Birmingham, No. 11365, 1990 WL 193326, at *5
(Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 1990). The article he cites observes that most (non-Delaware) courts have recognized the materiality threshold as being breached once profits decrease by at least 40%. Lou. R.
Kling & Eileen T. Nugent, Negotiated Acquisitions of Companies, Subsidiaries and Divisions
§ 11.04[9], at 11–66 (2018 ed.).
192. Akorn, 2018 WL 4719347, at *57.
193. Id. at *56.
194. E.g., Manwaring, supra note 12 (“[T]he Akorn decision simply represents an application of Delaware’s policy of freedom of contract to an egregious set of facts”).
195. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 827-28 (“[T]he materiality standard has been interpreted
by courts to be so demanding that—absent a cataclysm of biblical proportions—it cannot be met”).
196. Richard W. Slack & Joshua M. Glasser argue that Laster did actually try to create some
guidance for what an objective materiality threshold would be. They argue that Laster’s reference to
Kling and Nugent’s 40% threshold was an endorsement (if lukewarm) for using such a threshold for
drops in financial performance that would trigger a general MAC. They also argue that Laster sets a
20% threshold for departures from represented conditions when he rules that the 21% drop in overall valuation constitutes an MAE. I disagree that Laster was trying to establish an exact benchmark.
He clearly states that the 40% threshold is not dispositive (see text accompanying note 191). Regarding the 20% indicator, he bases his analysis on several academic studies that point to 20% being
used as a threshold in non-merger situations, including the threshold at which a drop in stock prices
becomes a bear market. 2018 WL 4719347, at *75 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018). He repeatedly uses the
phrase “cross-check” to hammer home the point that he is using these studies and indicators to con-
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2. Purpose
The second frontier at which MAC clauses and the frustration doctrine interact is purpose. The frustration doctrine only applies in situations where a party’s principal purpose in entering a transaction has been frustrated. Thus, it follows that MAC clauses should be read as altering this default rule. However,
“the leading MAC case law holds that the clause can be triggered only when the
principal purpose of a corporate acquirer—to purchase a profitable business as
part of a long-term corporate strategy—is thwarted.” 197
Before Akorn, Schwartz noted that the then-recent Hexion case provided
hope that factors beyond the principal purpose could be considered. 198 The
Hexion court hinted that the courts could consider a purpose other than the usual
one (“purchasing the target as part of a long-term strategy”) if “evidence to the
contrary” was presented. 199 Of the four elements of frustration that Schwartz
identified, this is the element that Akorn does not address explicitly. However,
there are several paragraphs dedicated to whether the synergistic value created
by the deal can be considered when evaluating the magnitude of the change in
value. 200 Laster concludes that Akorn should only be evaluated as a standalone
company, but crucially hints that might not have been the case if the definition
had explicitly mentioned the combined company. 201 While this doesn’t specifically address secondary purposes as the basis for a MAC claim, it does show
that courts will at the very least consider any purposes that are explicitly listed
in the merger agreement, rather than uniformly evaluating every MAC claim by
the effect on the long-term profit potential of the target corporation.

firm his intuition that Fresenius would consider the breaches material. Id. This kind of logic reinforces that he’s making the correct decision in this case, but isn’t trying to create a 20% threshold
for all future breaches of representations. That being said, I don’t entirely dismiss Slack and Glasser’s analysis. If a future Chancery Court decision comes to a similar conclusion, then it would be
reasonable for practitioners to assume that 20% is the standard for breaches in representation. As
Slack and Glasser put it: “Litigants . . . will have to explain why they believe that Vice Chancellor
Laster’s quasi-bright-line of 20 percent is off. Future cases will likely test whether an over-20 percent valuation hit automatically counts as quantitatively significant.” Slack & Glasser, supra note
12, at 38–39. So far, we have had an indication that Laster’s decision will be cited favorably, as
seen Dermatology Assocs. of San Antonio v. Oliver St. Dermatology Mgmt. LLC, No. CV 20170665-KSJM, 2020 WL 4581674, at *27 (Del. Ch. Aug. 10, 2020). In that decision, the court favorably cited to Akorn in ruling that the departure of several important physicians from a group, which
led to an 11% decline in total revenue, was a material change in line with past decisions. Id.
197. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 830.
198. Id. at 832.
199. Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 738 (Del. Ch. 2008).
200. Akorn, 2018 WL 4719347, at *56.
201. Id. (“In my view, the plain language of the definition of [a MAC] makes clear that any
[MAC] must be evaluated on a standalone basis . . . . If the parties had contemplated a synergistic
approach, the definition would have referred to the surviving corporation or the combined company.”).
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3. Risk Allocation
Next, Schwartz argues that MAC clauses alter the default risk allocation
that exists under the frustration doctrine. 202 In the event of purpose being frustrated by an event out of both parties’ control, the frustration doctrine allows the
party asserting it to place the risk of those events on the other party. 203 In acquisitions, this means that frustration places the risk of these exogenous events
on the seller, since it is the buyer that asserts frustration in the case of frustrated
purpose. 204 As the standard clause analog to frustration, MAC clauses allow
parties to shift the risk of exogenous events from the seller back to the buyer by
allowing the parties to carve out certain events (such as changes in GAAP practices or general economic conditions) and prevent those events from being used
to cancel the deal. 205 The idea that MAC clauses allocate risk away from the
seller using carve-outs was not a novel idea when Schwartz wrote his article, 206
but Akorn repeated it once again, stating “the typical [MAC] clause allocates
general market or industry risk to the buyer and company-specific risks to the
seller . . . (which it accomplishes by) placing the general risk of [a MAC] on the
seller, then using exception to reallocate specific categories of risk to the buyer.” 207 On its own, this quote is simply restating something already known by
the practitioners who write these agreements, but Laster’s explicit adoption of
Schwartz’s wording and theory is another step towards showing his adoption of
Schwartz’s general theory of MAC interpretation.
4. Foreseeability
Finally, the frustration doctrine requires that “only unforeseeable risks can
provide grounds for excuse,” since if parties meant to exclude specific risks,
they would have contracted around them. 208 Again, the very existence of a
MAC clause (combined with softening sentiment toward the frustration requirement of unforeseeability) 209 should signal the intent of the parties to allow
for foreseeable risks. 210 Despite this, the IBP court seemed to endorse the unforeseeability requirement, stating that the MAC clause should be viewed as a
202. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 832.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 832–33.
206. See generally Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 22 (describing in detail how carve-outs and
exception allocate risk between buyer and sellers).
207. Akorn Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 WL 4719347, at *49 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 1, 2018). The article also directly quotes Schwartz on the matter, saying “[T]he risk of a
target MAC resulting from a carved-out clause is allocated to the acquirer, while the risk of a target
MAC resulting from any other cause is allocated to the target.” Id. at n. 532 (quoting Schwartz, supra note 5, at 822).
208. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 833.
209. See id. At 809-10.
210. See id. at 834.
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“backstop protecting the acquiror from the occurrence of unknown events.” 211
Schwartz views this as foolish for a number of reasons. 212 First, MAC clauses
do not mention foreseeability, even though they have other language specifying
what types of changes do qualify. 213 Second, most events that qualify under a
MAC clause (like management shortcomings) are foreseeable by the nature of
businesses. 214
By ruling that a MAC had occurred, the Akorn decision implicitly and explicitly endorses both of these points. 215 First, the court directly says that “the
parties could have defined [a MAC] as including only unforeseeable effects,
changes, events, or occurrences. They did none of these things.” 216 This part of
the decision even cites to Schwartz. 217 Second, while the factors leading the
MAC in Akorn were “unexpected,” 218 they certainly were not unforeseeable.
Schwartz said that in a situation such as this one, “a huge dropoff in profits due
to gross mismanagement” is “quite foreseeable,” a proposition that any follower
of the news would likely find unsurprising. 219 Thus, by finding a MAC had occurred, Vice Chancellor Laster endorsed Schwartz’s contention that foreseeability is not a requirement of MAC clauses. 220
C. Now What? Renegotiations Swing Even Further in Buyers’ Favor
What does this all mean for the future of mergers and acquisitions law?
There are three primary possible outcomes.
First, Schwartz’s theory could have been incorrect or at least flawed, leaving any conclusions from it irrelevant. While his logic seems sound, one potential hole in his argument was pointed out in an article by Professor Judd F.

211. In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001) (emphasis added).
212. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 834.
213. Id.
214. Id. Schwartz also argues that “an unforeseeability requirement would come close to
reading the MAC clause out of existence because, in the cosmic sense, everything is foreseeable.”
Id.
215. Akorn, 2018 WL 4719347, at *61.
216. Id.
217. Id. at n. 629 (“[S]see also [Schwartz] (providing additional arguments why [MAC] provisions should not be interpreted to contain an implied foreseeability term).”).
218. Id. at *61 (“[T]he evidence shows that the events that resulted in a General MAE at
Akorn were unexpected.”).
219. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 834.
220. See Akorn, 2018 WL 4719347, at *61. The opinion also states that “assuming for the
sake of argument that Akorn was correct and Fresenius had foreseen [the events], I do not believe
that would change the result given the allocation of risk under the definition of a [MAC] set forth in
the Merger Agreement.” Id. While this seems like the golden quote that clearly supports Schwartz,
the reference to the specific Akorn and Fresenius merger agreement seems to diminish its broad
applicability. That being said, there is nothing out of the ordinary about the terms of that merger
agreement and thus one would be forgiven for thinking this quote puts the foreseeable/unforeseeable
debate to rest for good.
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Sneirson, who argued that reading contract law principles into merger agreements can be inappropriate because merger agreements should be guided by
corporate law principles in addition to contract law principles. 221 Many principles of contract law are guided by the simple premise of two parties coming to
an agreement, but the reality of corporate environments is that deals involve
many fiduciaries acting on behalf of the entity they represent who must be responsive to the accompanying fiduciary duties they owe. 222 This conflict has
left courts juggling a variety of frameworks to view deal protection methods
through, and Delaware courts have seemed to flip-flop between several different
approaches. 223 While Sneirson ultimately endorses contract law principles, his
analysis could shed light on a crucial flaw in Schwartz’s theory: If contract law
cannot be strictly followed in corporate law cases, then perhaps the Chancery
Court’s decision to ignore some of its basic principles in previous MAC cases
can be forgiven. Other scholars, however, have weighed in in favor of contract
law supremacy, with one even specifically addressing the IBP ruling and positing that subordinating contract values to corporate principles in mergers is “unnecessary and improperly devalues contract doctrine.” 224 Following Sneirson’s
concluding sentence, where he suggests “corporate law should recognize and
consider contract . . . and incorporate, where appropriate, useful lessons from
these other areas of [contract] law,” I think that Schwartz’s analysis still holds
up. 225 But perhaps future courts may disagree. 226
A second, more likely possibility is that Schwartz’s analysis was correct,
but that courts will determine that Vice Chancellor Laster’s Akorn opinion did
not generally adopt Schwartz’s theory, but instead cherry-picked several parts
of it to solidify his point in a case that had uniquely egregious facts. I will discuss what this looks like in the following section.
221. See generally Judd F. Sneirson, Merger Agreements, Termination Fees, and the Contract-Corporate Tension, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 573 (2002). It is important to note that this
article is not a direct response to Schwartz (it came out three years earlier). While it concerns termination fees, rather than MACs, the shared status of both types of clauses as deal protection devices
makes the analysis sufficiently relevant.
222. See id. at 574.
223. See id. at 606–07. Delaware courts suggested contract law supremacy in Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), corporate law supremacy in Paramount Communications, Inc.
v. QVC Networks, Inc. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994), and then suggested a four-factor balancing test in
ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95 (Del. Ch. 1999). See id at 606–08.
224. Celia R. Taylor, When Good Mergers Go Bad: Controlling Corporate Managers Who
Suffer a Change of Heart, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 577, 580–81 (2003). Ironically, Taylor’s endorsement of contract law led her to a different conclusion than Schwartz, characterizing IBP as “an important example of an appropriately balanced approach.” See id. Of course, Schwartz’s specific
quarrel with IBP was not whether VC Strine applied contract law, but how he did so. See Schwartz,
supra note 5, at 826-27 (citing IBP as the first in a line of several decisions that created a materiality
standard without regard for preexisting case law interpreting materiality in contracts).
225. Sneirson, supra note 221, at 629.
226. Given that Schwartz’s article was published in a prominent law review and doesn’t appear to have been meaningfully critiqued by any other scholars in the decade since it was published,
I would lean towards his theory being generally accepted by other scholars, if not yet by courts.
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The third possibility is that Laster’s opinion will give courts the ammunition
they need to reverse the trend of seller-friendly rulings and finally give the text
of merger agreements the meaning it was intended to have (and deserves).
In the final section of his article, Schwartz gives an example of what this
could look like in practice. 227 In late 2008, financial giants Bank of America
and Merrill Lynch agreed to a $50 billion acquisition agreement that would
have created the largest bank in the country. 228 Before closing, the financial
crisis had set in, and Merrill posted a staggering $15 billion loss in the fourth
quarter of that year alone. 229 Despite this astonishing number, Bank of America
closed the deal on New Year’s Day 2009. 230 Schwartz argues that it seemed
like they had no choice. 231 After all, there still had not been a successful MAC
claim in Delaware by that time. 232 The primary issue was that even though
Merrill Lynch had lost an astounding $15 billion, the parties may have believed
that such a short-term loss was meaningless based on the existing precedent. 233
And they likely would have been right. 234 This was a clear example of a company making a decision that it likely would not have if courts correctly interpreted MAC clauses as a standard clause analog to the frustration doctrine. 235
D. Finally, a Sign? Channel Medsystems v. Boston Scientific
In the immediate aftermath of Akorn, there were no important indications of
how future courts would apply Vice Chancellor Laster’s reasoning. 236 That

227. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 835–38.
228. Id. at 835.
229. See id.
230. Id.
231. See id at 835–36. In the end, the decision not to sue and claim a MAC was made by the
government as much as Bank of America. Id. at 836. Fearing that financial chaos would ensue if a
MAC was asserted, the Treasury Secretary threatened to replace the bank’s directors and then secretly offered $20 billion in taxpayer financing. Id. However, regardless of the external pressure,
the entire situation was informed by the existing court precedent, and thus the analysis is still relevant (if less convincing). See id. at 835–36. For more details on the government intervention, see
Bank of America and Merrill Lynch: How Did a Private Deal Turn Into a Federal Bailout?: Joint
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform and the Subcomm. on Domestic
Po’ly, 111th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter “Hearings”].
232. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 837.
233. Id. Ben Bernanke, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve stated in the subsequent
hearings that the leading precedent held that “short-term losses, no matter how large” could not
qualify as a MAC. See id. at 837 & n.280 (quoting Hearings, supra note 231).
234. See id. (calling Chairman Bernanke’s statement “correct”).
235. Although in this case, this result could have led to serious further damage to the financial
system. See id. at 838 (“The government felt strongly that if Bank of America invoked the MAC
clause, it could have seriously damaged the then-fragile financial system.”).
236. My research indicates that none of the ten occasions on which Akorn was cited in opinions before December 2019 were related to MACs. See, e.g., Himawan v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 20180075-SG, 2018 WL 6822708, at *7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 28, 2018) (citing Akorn as a source for various
standards of “efforts” clauses).
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changed in late December 2019, when the Chancery Court weighed in on the
potential termination of a deal between two medical technology companies. 237
In the decision, Chancellor Bouchard ruled that no MAC had occurred, a decision that some felt was proof that Akorn was simply a one-off case, not a “watershed moment that would make such findings more common.” 238 But examining the text of Bouchard’s opinion leads to no such conclusion. In fact,
Bouchard’s reasoning remains consistent with Laster’s, with perhaps the only
salient difference being a set of facts that even Schwartz would likely agree do
not represent a MAC.
In 2017, Boston Scientific entered into an agreement with Channel Medsystems, of which Boston was already a minority owner, to purchase the remaining
outstanding equity of the company for $275 million. 239 The agreement was
conditioned on FDA approval of Cerene, Channel’s only product, and would
close following FDA approval. 240 Less than two months after signing the
agreement, Channel discovered that its Vice President of Quality, Dinesh Shankar, had used falsified documents to pilfer approximately $2.6 million from the
company. 241 After discovering this, Channel immediately took action, notifying
Boston Scientific of the fraud, hiring a forensic accounting firm to determine
the extent of Shankar’s misdeeds, and filing a remediation plan with the FDA
(who accepted the plan and indicated that Shankar’s fraud would not affect the
approval of Cerene). 242 Despite this assurance from the FDA, Boston announced its intent to terminate the merger agreement in May 2018, alleging that
Shankar’s misconduct led to an uncurable breach of the agreement. 243 In March
of 2019, the FDA approved Cerene, a timeline consistent with what the parties
expected at the time the agreement was made and six months before the contractual deadline for such approval, thus effectively eliminating what would
have been the primary grounds for a MAC. 244 In his ruling, Chancellor Bou-

237. See Channel Medsystems, Inc. v. Boston Sci. Corp., No. 2018-0673-AGB, 2019 WL
6896462, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2019).
238. Jason M. Halper et al., The Delaware Court of Chancery Rejects Termination of Merger
Agreement Based on Material Adverse Effect, NAT’L. L. REV. (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.natlaw
review.com/article/delaware-court-chancery-rejects-termination-merger-agreement-based-materialadverse; see also Amy L. Simmerman et al., Delaware Court of Chancery Declines to Find Material Adverse Effect and Orders Specific Performance of a Merger, WILSON SONSINI (Jan. 6, 2020),
https://www.wsgr.com/en/insights/delaware-court-of-chancery-declines-to-find-a-material-adverseeffect-and-orders-specific-performance-of-a-merger.html (“[T]he new decision, consistent with prior case law, reflects that buyers claiming [a MAC] face a heavy burden and that Akorn was not a
turning point in Delaware law.”).
239. Boston Sci. Corp., 2019 WL 6896462, at *5.
240. Id. at *4.
241. See id. at *1. Shankar pled guilty for fraud and is now in prison. He has since repaid almost the entirety of the $2.57 million. Id. at *7.
242. See id. at *6–12.
243. See id. at *13.
244. See id. at *14 (“[Boston Scientific’s quality expert] confirmed that the FDA’s approval
necessarily reflects its conclusion that Cerene is safe and effective . . . and that its clinical data is
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chard ruled that no MAC had occurred and ordered specific performance of the
agreement. 245
At first glance, this decision runs counter to Akorn, making it clear that at
the very least, Akorn did not pave the way for years of courts siding with buyers
and counterbalancing the previous two decades. But closer examination reveals
that Bouchard’s opinion positively cites to Akorn in several places without ever
calling into question Vice Chancellor Laster’s reasoning. In addition, the opinion is overall at least partially consistent with the Schwartz analytical framework, even though the flagrant facts of the case force a different result.
Channel argued that the fact that Shankar falsified only six test reports (out
of 138 submitted to the FDA) 246 could not possibly be considered material, especially since they had no impact on the FDA’s decision. 247 Bouchard disagreed, stating that “[d]epending on the circumstances, a single test report generated from falsified content may be significant enough to establish material
noncompliance.” 248 This lower threshold of materiality is reminiscent of Akorn,
with Bouchard even drawing a large block quote from Laster’s opinion and including Laster’s observation that a MAC can occur “without the effect on the
target’s business being felt yet.” 249
Bouchard made sure to emphasize that his ultimate decision was impacted
by “a lack of good faith” on the part of Boston Scientific, “corroborated by contemporaneous evidence that [the company] was looking for a way out of its deal
with Channel due to growing concerns that Cerene would be difficult to market
and the proposed transaction was complicating a potential divestment of part of
Boston Scientific’s business.” 250 Bouchard appeared to believe that Boston
Scientific’s position (that Shankar’s fraud would necessitate starting from
scratch) was “not objectively reasonable” given the FDA’s indication that product approval would not be affected. 251 Additionally, Boston Scientific switched
from that position just a few weeks before trial (when the FDA gave final approval) to a focus on the need for retesting of the product, a self-serving malleability that Bouchard felt made their new argument “not credible.” 252 The emphasis on corrupt motive as the precipitating factor is reminiscent of Vice

reliable, describing FDA approval as ‘the proof in the pudding’. [T]his meant that the FDA ‘had all
of the information [it] needed to make an informed decision’ when approving Cerene. Due to the
FDA’s approval, Channel can market Cerene in the Unites States immediately.”).
245. See id. at *1.
246. Id. at *6.
247. See id. at *21.
248. Id.
249. Id. at * 25 (citing Akron, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 WL
4719347, at *46 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018)).
250. Id. at *38 (citing Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 75556 (Del. Ch. 2008)).
251. Id. at *31.
252. Id. at *29.
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Chancellor Strine’s IBP reasoning. 253 But part of the reason that IBP was ascribed such doctrinal significance since was that at the time it marked the most
in-depth Delaware interpretation of a MAC clause. Now that this field has been
flushed out more thoroughly over the past two decades, future courts should
recognize Boston Scientific for what it is—a clear case of pretextual reasoning
by a self-serving party to escape a bad deal, not an example of a MAC.
For a proponent of Akorn’s relaxed MAC standard, Boston Scientific is not
the ideal subsequent case. But it is important to recognize that even though the
two opinions reach different decisions, the court had little choice but to reject
the MAC claim given that the FDA’s approval of Cerene negated the main
premise on which the claim was based. The court even separately found that
Boston had breached its own responsibility to use commercially reasonable efforts to close the deal, a circumstance that left little room for finding that a
MAC had occurred. 254 Despite the case coming to a different result than Akorn,
the chief takeaway is that Chancellor Bouchard’s opinion adopts much of
Akorn’s reasoning without expressing any disagreement, which, if anything,
proves that Laster’s opinion will likely be cited in many more future decisions.
While Boston Scientific may not be a ringing endorsement of Akorn’s message,
the two opinions share reasoning that is entirely consistent. Boston Scientific is
simply an example of a court with no other option given the egregious facts at
hand, and it certainly does not preclude future courts from using Akorn as the
future standard for the next generation of MAC cases, paving the way for a
more relaxed (and correct) interpretation of contract law.
E. What’s Next? COVID-19 is Giving Courts Opportunities to
Test Akorn
In November 2019, the first known case of the novel coronavirus (COVID19) was discovered. 255 Within months, the respiratory virus had inspired a
worldwide panic. 256 What started as a localized health concern became a pandemic, infecting over 140 million people and leading to more than three million
deaths at the time of this Article. 257 Reacting to potential chaos and the effects
of restrictive measures imposed by both individuals and governments across the
world, financial markets fell into freefall. 258 On March 12, 2020, the day after

253. In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001).
254. Boston Sci. Corp., 2019 WL 6896462, at *1.
255. Josephine Ma, Coronavirus: China’s First Confirmed Covid-19 Case Traced Back to
November 17, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 14, 2020, 12:45 AM), https://www.scmp.com/news
/china/society/article/3074991/coronavirus-chinas-first-confirmed-covid-19-case-traced-back.
256. See Coronavirus: World in ‘Uncharted Territory’ BBC (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.
bbc.com/news/world-51712437.
257. See Coronavirus World Map: Tracking the Global Outbreak, N.Y. TIMES (April 3, 2021,
12:12 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/world/coronavirus-maps.html.
258. See Travel Limits, Economic Fears Stoke Market Plunge, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/12/business/stock-market-today.html.
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the World Health Organization had officially categorized the disease as a pandemic, 259 the Dow Jones dropped by 10%, the largest such drop since 1987. 260
As the world ramped up its efforts to stop the spread of the virus, businesses
faced an uncertain future. 261 The mergers and acquisitions community braced
for impact, with many prominent law firms publishing predictive guides for clients and attorneys, many of which focused on the MAC as an area to watch. 262
Two major impacts on MACs were expected. First, an increase in the number
of companies invoking the MAC clause, forcing courts to confront Akorn’s impact, was expected. 263 Second, a change in MAC clauses themselves was expected, as dealmakers bargained over whether to include COVID-19 (and general pandemic) related exceptions. 264
During the financial crisis of the late 2000s, there was a strong decline in
merger and acquisition activity. 265 But while there was a short-term decline in
merger activity at the outset of the pandemic, deal-making quickly rebounded,
with an estimated 17-20% increase in merger activity in the second half of 2020
over the first half. 266 However, the beginning of the pandemic saw major deals
broken as economic uncertainty joined forces with financing concerns, travel
restrictions, due diligence complications, and supply chain disruptions to leave
buyers uncertain of how to evaluate their prospective targets. 267

259. See Coronavirus Confirmed as Pandemic by World Health Organization, BBC (Mar. 11,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-51839944.
260. Travel Limits, Economic Fears Stoke Market Plunge, supra note 258.
261. See id.
262. See James Anderson et al., Coronavirus/COVID-19: Implications for Commercial and
Financial Contracts, SKADDEN, ARPS (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.skadden.com/insights
/publications/2020/02/coronavirus-covid19-implications; see also, Marcia Ellis et al., The Impact of
the COVID-19 Outbreak on PE Investors and their Portfolio Companies in Asia – Part 1,
MORRISON FOERSTER (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.mofo.com/resources/insights/200220-covid-19pe-investors-portfolio-companies-asia-part-1.html; see also Scott A. Barshay et al., Is the Coronavirus a Material Adverse Effect?, PAUL WEISS (Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.paulweiss.com
/practices/transactional/mergers-acquisitions/publications/is-the-coronavirus-a-material-adverseeffect?id=30800.
263. See Barshay, et al, supra note 262.
264. See Caroline Blitzer Phillips, Vinson & Elkins LLP, Does the COVID-19 Outbreak Constitute a Material Adverse Effect? Plus Other Impacts on M&A Transactions, JD SUPRA (Mar. 13,
2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/does-the-covid-19-outbreak-constitute-a-85203/. Other
representations and warranties will be affected as well. We will likely see more negotiation regarding the “ordinary course of business” covenant (which Akorn also addressed) as well as an increase
in representations and warranties insurance (which will likely be tweaked to avoid many of the
known risks of COVID-19). See id.
265. See JEFF GELL ET AL., THE BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, ACCELERATING OUT OF THE
GREAT RECESSION 7 (June 2010), https://image-src.bcg.com/Images/BCG_Accelerating_Out_of_
the_Great_Recession_M_and_A_Jul_10_tcm108-117898.pdf (estimating that total merger value
was almost cut in half between 2008 and 2009).
266. Global M&A Industry Trends, PWC (Apr. 21, 2021, 12:34 PM),
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/services/deals/trends.html.
267. See Benjamin Horney, 7 Major M&A Deals That Broke Down Due to COVID-19,
LAW360 (Jan. 11, 2021, 8:39 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1342476/7-major-m-a-deals-
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Further complicating the broken deals was uncertainty over whether or not
the exceptions already present in most agreements would cover COVID-19. A
study conducted by Harvard Law School professor John Coates found that
while only 33% of large merger agreements in the year before the pandemic
used MAC definitions that excluded “pandemics, epidemics, public health crises, or influenzas,” 87% contained exclusions for “natural disasters, crises, or
calamities.” 268 In a late-2020 decision, the Chancery Court hinted that it would
allow this second, broader, and more prevalent definition to encompass COVID
related MAC claims, ruling that such language was sufficient to preclude a
MAC claim in a $5.8 billion hotel deal between a Chinese insurance company
and Korean financial services conglomerate. 269 Akorn itself, interestingly
enough, was an example of a deal that would likely except the pandemic from
its MAC definition. Unlike, IBP, which lacked many exceptions, 270 Akorn’s
agreement had a long list of potential occurrences that were specially exempted
from the MAC clause. 271 Specifically, it exempted anything “resulting from or
attributable to . . . pandemics . . . , force majeure events or other comparable
events.” 272 In light of the WHO’s decision to officially deem the virus a pandemic, it seems clear the effects of COVID would be excepted under this type
of language.
Thus, it appears that COVID itself will not be a major instigator for a new
spate of illuminating MAC litigation. As the world adapts to the post-COVID
era, it appears negotiators will negotiate exclusions that will leave no doubt in
the minds of the courts that they intend to exclude the virus. Morgan Stanley’s
$14.5 billion acquisition of E*Trade (the largest Wall Street acquisition since
the last financial crisis) has already provided an example of what a more specific clause might look like. 273 The merger agreement excluded any “epidemic,

that-broke-down-due-to-covid-19 (summarizing seven large deals that were called off either due to
or concurrently with the beginning of the pandemic); see also Ann Marie Uetz, et al., Managing the
Commercial Impact of the Coronavirus: Impacts on the Corporate & Securities Landscape, Including M&A and Public Company Reporting Considerations, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP: INSIGHTS (Mar.
13,
2020),
https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2020/03/coronavirus-corporatesecurities-ma-reporting (outlining the kind of disruptions that were expected by dealmakers at the
start of the pandemic); see also Richard Harroch et al, The Impact of the Coronavirus Crisis on
Mergers and Acquisitions, FORBES (Apr. 17, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/allbusiness
/2020/04/17/impact-of-coronavirus-crisis-on-mergers-and-acquisitions/?sh=6796a842200a (explaining that concerns such as due diligence complications and financing uncertainty slowed down dealmaking at the outset of the pandemic).
268. AB Stable VIII LLC v. Maps Hotels & Resorts One LLC, C.A. No. 2020-0310-JTL,
2020 WL 7024929, at *63-64 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2020).
269. See id. at *57–59.
270. See Agreement, supra note 68.
271. See Akorn, Inc., Current Report, Exhibit 2.1 (Form 8-K) (Apr. 24, 2017).
272. Id. at § 8.12 (defining “Material Adverse Effect”).
273. See Analysis: Morgan Stanley, E*Trade Merger Excludes Coronavirus, BLOOMBERG
LAW (Feb. 20, 2020, 3:25 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysismorgan-stanley-e-trade-merger-excludes-coronavirus.
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pandemic or disease outbreak (including the COVID-19 virus)” that would reasonably be expected to result in a MAC. 274 Similar to how companies began to
increase exceptions for acts of terrorism in the wake of 9/11, it would be surprising if all other deals in the near future do not include similar language, particularly as companies factor in the expected impact of the virus into the initial
deal price. 275 Besides the AB Stable hotel deal, there have been very few other
broken deals that have resulted in Chancery Court decisions, and anticipated
major litigation frequently does not make it to trial. 276 One case to keep an eye
on is Agspring v. NGP, which favorably cited to Akorn’s relaxed standard at the
pleadings phase, but does not appear to have reached any further stage yet. 277
But even though COVID does not appear to be directly instigating substantially more MAC litigation, the economic uncertainty it may bring to the world
over the next few years still could be a source of future litigation. Much of the
pandemic’s effects cannot be known in the very short-term, but regardless of
what the fallout ends up being, the broken mergers of 2020 and the possibility
of future economic uncertainty could force courts to take a more definitive
stand on MAC clauses. As explained above, they would be correct to choose
Akorn as their guide for doing so.

274. Id.
275. Id. The article notes that another large deal signed in late February for the purchase of
wells and pipelines includes an exclusion for “an outbreak of disease” but does not specifically
name COVID-19. See id; see also Barshay et al., supra note 262 (“As the COVID-19 outbreak continues, it is likely that sellers will negotiate for more specific references to pandemics and epidemics
in exceptions to the definition of [a MAC], just as terrorism exceptions became more commonplace
following the events of September 11, 2001.”).
276. Katelyn Crawford et al., FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP, DE Court of Chancery Weighs Terminating M&A Deals Under Material Adverse Effect Clauses, JD SUPRA (May 8, 2020),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/de-court-of-chancery-weighs-terminating-21410/
(detailing
four recent MAC claims and the grounds for each, most notably in the purchase of L Brands (Victoria’s Secret) by Sycamore Partners). Three of the claims were settled in some form, and the other
appears to still be pending. Carleton English, L Brands, Sycamore Partners Reach Mutual Agreement’ Terminating Sale of Victoria’s Secret, BARRONS (May 4, 2020, 5:22 PM),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/l-brands-sycamore-partners-abandon-victorias-secret-deal51588627374; Gillian Tan, SoftBank Commits $1 Billion to WeWork Amid Membership Drop,
BLOOMBERG https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-13/softbank-injects-1-1-billioninto-wework-as-membership-drops (Aug. 12, 2020 8:17 PM); Rich Duprey, Bed Bath & Beyond
Settles Lawsuit With 1-800-Flowers, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Jul. 22, 2020, 1:08 PM),
https://www.fool.com/investing/2020/07/22/bed-bath-beyond-settles-lawsuit-with-1-800flowers.aspx; Rose Krebs, Yoga Studio Chain Can’t Nix Suit Over Frozen Purchase Deal, Law360
(Aug. 19, 2021, 6:09 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1302554/yoga-studio-chain-can-t-nixsuit-over-frozen-purchase-deal
277. See Agspring Holdco, LLC v. NGP X US Holdings, L.P., C.A. No. 2019-0567-AGB,
2020 WL 4355555, at *17 & n.162 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2020) (citing Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi
AG, 2018 WL 4719347, at *53 and Raskin v. Birmingham Steel Corp., 1990 WL 193326, at *5
(Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 1990) to support that 47% reduction in forecasted EBITDA was sufficient to support an MAE claim at the pleadings stage).
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CONCLUSION
Courts have spent most of last twenty years dismissing even the most justified of MAC claims; and, in doing so, have violated the most basic principles of
contract law. The Delaware Chancery Court’s 2018 decision in Akorn, finding
that a MAC had occurred, finally will give future courts the precedent they need
to begin applying a more coherent (and correct) judicial philosophy. As we
begin the decade faced with economic uncertainty brought on by COVID-19,
courts could see an increase in MAC claims coming before them, giving them
the opportunity to cement Akorn as the guiding precedent for the future of MAC
jurisprudence.

